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i  IOne of the more  common  facts  in public  finance  is that, as countries  grow  richer,
the share  of their GDP  devoted  to public  expenditures  rises. Public  spending  in the U.S.,
for example,  was 7.5 percent  of GDP in 1913  and is 33 percent  today. Present-day
developed  country  governments  spend  about  twice as much as developing  countries.  Yet,
government  spending  on goods  and services  is the same  in developed  and developing
countries;  the difference  is almost  entirely  du^  to transfer  payments,  which  are about 22
percent of GDP  in the industrialized  world (Tanzi  and Schuknecht  [1997]). Most  of these
transfer  payments-unemployment  insurance,  pensions,  health insurance,  guaranteed
loans-have the characteristic  that  they are aimed  at mitigating  risk in the private
economy. In this paper, we explore  how the existing  framework  for evaluating
government  spending  on goods and services,  welfare  economics  (Samuelson  [1954],
Musgrave  [1959]),  can be extended  to incorporate  the government's  various  risk-reducing
activities. Since governments  do not typically  classify  their expenditures  by their risk-
altering  characteristics,  our approach  will be more conceptual  than empirical. We
illustrate  our points  with some  simple  examples  and  models  designed  to capture  the risk-
reducing  properties  of various  public  expenditures.  Our conclusion  is that, when  viewed
from a risk-reducing  perspective,  the benefits  and costs  of certain  public expenditures  can
be quite different,  indicating  directions  of change  in the composition  of public  spending
that are welfare-enhancing.
In section  I of the paper,  after speculating  on why,  as countries  grow richer,
governments  spend  more  on these  risk-mitigating  transfer  programs,  we spell  out our
analytical  framework. In section  II, we apply  the framework  to a series  of common
2programs associated, directly or indirectly, with the reduction of risk, including crop
insurance, medical care, income support, flood control and education loans.  Section III
offers some concluding remarks.
I.  Analytical Framework
The framework for evaluating public expenditures aimed at reducing risk begins
with the metric for valuing the reduction of risk to the individual, which is the familiar
von Neumann-Morgenstem framework. The value of reducing risk (or, alternatively, the
demand for risk-reducing activity) is due to the assumption that individuals have
declining marginal utility of income, or, are risk-averse. As a result, people will
generally prefer a certain outcome to a risky one with the same expected value. A job at
$20,000 per year is better than taking a 50% chance on getting one at $40,000  with a
50% chance of no income at all. How much that is worth depends on how much greater
the difference in utility is between $20,000 and zero than the difference between $20,000
and $40,000.  There is an amount of money that one is willing to pay to assure an income
of  $20,000 (minus that payment) as opposed to taking the risk.  This is called the risk
premium and the amnount  of income left over after paying the premium is called the
certainty equivalent income to the risky situation.
Fornally,  this can be expressed as U(W-V) = EU(W + Ze.) where U(-) is the
utility function of income (strictly speaking, wealth) denoted W, V is the maximum
amount one would pay to have a certain income relative to the variable one.  The
expectations operator E takes the average of utility when wealth is risky and  Yei is the
3sum  of all risky components  of wealth. This expression  says  that there is a value V
which  makes the individual  indifferent  between  the certainty  equivalent  income  W-V and
the situation  in which  that person  faces  all risks. The risky component  is written  as a sum
of potentially  many  different  "shocks"  to income  in which  only their sum-their  net
impact  on income-is  of ultimate  concern  to the individual.
We can use this framework  to speculate  on why  public  spending  on risk-reduction
increases  with incomes. At first glance,  this seems  counter-intuitive,  since  a common
assumption  is that people's aversion  to a given  amount  of risk declines  with income,  so
that  the risk premium  (and  therefore  the benefits  from  government  spending  to reduce
risk) would  be higher in poorer  countries'.
T'he  countervailing  effect  is that  the magnitude  of the shocks  to income  is much
greater  in rich countries. Many  of the risks  that public  programs  mitigate  are related  to
income. If someone  earning  $100,000  loses  a job, the absolute  value of the loss is
considerably  greater  than if the initial  income  was $20,000. Can this feature  explain  the
large  variation  in public  spending  on risk-reduction  across  countries  and over time? With
constant  relative  risk aversion,  if losses  are strictly  proportional  to income,  then so will be
the premium,  in which  case  this feature  alone  cannot  explain  the variation  in public
spending 2. If, however,  the losses  are more  than  proportional  to income,  then  the
premium  (as a percentage  of income)  rises quite  dramatically  with income  (Figure 1). If,
for example,  the level of income  that  one is left with after  a typical  shock  to income  rises
'A  more  common  assumption  is that  people  have  declining  absolute  risk aversion  but constant  relative  risk
aversion.
2  model  is one  where  the individual  with  income  YO  has a probability  p of having  his income  drop to
Y, (and  probability  (l-p) of keeping  it at YO).  If a is the degree  of relative  risk  aversion  (so that  the utility
4with income,  but only with an elasticity  of 0.8, we observe  that the risk premium  rises
from zero  to nearly 18  percent  of income  at levels  of around  $6,000. That this gap of 18
percent also happens  to be close  to the difference  in public  spending  on transfers  between
developed  and developing  countries  suggests  that such  reasoning  is a plausible
explanation  for the difference.
That income  after  losses rises  less-than-proportionately  with income is plausible,
but context-specific.  Losses  could be more  than proportionate  to income if financial
losses are related  to wealth,  which  rises faster  than income. As argued  by Pritchett
[1997],  average  incomes  in poor countries  are simply  too close  to actual  subsistence  that
drops  from these levels cannot  be very large and still be sustainable.  Losses  could also be
less than  proportional.  When  disaster  strikes,  people  in rich countries  have  more to lose,
but not proportionately  so, since  there may be other  mechanisms  to cushion  the blow. To
take one example,  an earthquake  in California  will do significantly  more damage  (in
terms  of the value of the capital  stock  lost)  than a comparable  one in Armenia. Yet, the
difference  is not proportional  to the relative  income  of the two places  because  California
can afford  to build  more earthquake-resistant  structures.
function  is  U(Y)  = Y"'/(l-a)),  then  the  risk  premium  is  given  by  V  =  -[pY,'u  + (I-p)YO  1 ]"('') . If
Y,=  fY0, then  V/Yo  is a constant
5Figure  1: Risk premium  as a share of





0  1000  2000  3000  4000  5000  6000
A second  possibility  might  be that, as countries  develop,  traditional  ties that
provided  informal  insurance  through  families  and communities  tend  to loosen,  increasing
demand  for insurance  services  from more  formal  markets  or from the government  if
insurance  markets  don't grow  to accommodate  this demand. However,  the causality
could  just as easily  run the other  way: the development  of formal  insurance  markets  or
government  programs  may be the reason  that family  structures  loosen  in the first place.
This evaluation  of risk-reducing  expenditures  in terms  of displacement  of alternative
mechanisms  is discussed  in more detail  below.
Just because  we can "explain"  the higher  government  expenditure  in developed
countries  in terms  of risk-reduction  does  not mean all of those  expenditures  are  justified.
The reason  is that  public  expenditures  in general  are  justified  only when there are market
failures  or distributional  concerns,  and this is true for risk-reducing  public expenditures
too.  After  briefly  sketching  out  the foundations  of this approach  to public-expenditure
analysis,  we turn therefore  to an examination  of potential  failures  in risk markets,  and
proceed  to explore  the implications  for public  policy  in some  special  cases.
6The framework  for evaluating  government  spending  on goods and services  is
based  on the rationale  for public  intervention  in the economy  which,  in turn, is derived
from the fundamental  theorems  of welfare  economics. If the conditions  of the first
welfare  theorem  were to hold,  there  would  be no need for a government,  since  the
unfettered  market would  reach a Pareto-efficient  allocation. If there is a concern  for
equity,  then the second  welfare  theorem  shows  how, with a suitable  redistribution  of
initial endowments,  the desired  Pareto-efficient  allocation  can be achieved  by the private
market. Hence,  the rationale  for public  intervention  must be associated  with one or more
of the conditions  of the welfare  theorems  not being met. The most common  ones are the
existence  of externalities,  public  goods,  noncompetitive  markets,  and various elements  of
imperfect  information  (often  collectively  referred  to as "market  failure")  on the one hand,
and the inability  to redistribute  endowments  to achieve  equity  objectives  on the other.
This simple  point alone  can be a powerful  tool in scrutinizing  public  expenditures.  The
largest  item in the Indian  government's  agriculture  budget,  for example,  is a fertilizer
subsidy. Forty years ago,  the subsidy  was  justified  on the grounds  that it was a new
technology  so unknown  and inherently  risky that individual  farmers  may not have an
incentive  to adopt it. Today,  the market-failure  rationale  for the subsidy  has all but
disappeared  (Pradhan  and Pillai-Essex  [1994]).
The existence  of a market  failure  only indicates  a rationale  for government
intervention;  it does  not necessarily  imply a need for public  expenditure. The textbook
case  of an externality  is the polluting  factory,  which  emits toxic chemicals  into a stream,
inflicting  a cost to downstream  users  of that stream. While  the competitive  equilibrium  in
7this case  will not be Pareto  optimal,  the solution  is typically  to levy  a pollution  tax on the
factory,  rather  than some  public  expenditure  program.
Finally,  for cases  where  there is some  market  failure,  and where  public
expenditure  is the most appropriate  instrument,  there  remains  the issue of how  important
the market  failure  is. Since  governments  have,  limited  resources,  we need to have a sense
of the quantitative  benefits  and costs of these different  expenditure  programs  in order  to
allocate  public  resources  rationally. The quantitative  assessment  is made up of two
components:  the difference  between  social  and private  benefits  (in the price dimension),
and the net addition  of service  (in the quantity  dimension).  In evaluating  these  benefits
and costs,  we need  to keep  in mind  that most cases  of market  failure  are ones  where  a
private  market  exists,  but does  not provide  the socially  optimal  level of output For
example,  many  believe  that education  carries  with it a positive  externality,  insofar  as
society  attaches  a value to having  a literate  and numerate  population,  beyond  the benefit
increasing  his wage  that the individual  receives  from education 3. Yet, education  is
mainly  a private  good, since  it benefits  the individual  by increasing  his wages.  The
benefit  of public  provision  of education  (assuming  provision  is the best instrument),  then,
is the increment  in the external  effect  of the additional  educational  attainment  over and
above what  the private  sector  would  have  achieved  in the absence  of public  intervention.
Since  education,  and many  other  public  services,  are  nontraded  goods,  the calculation  of
net benefits  should  take into account  the extent  to which  public  provision  crowds  out the
Some  claim education  to be a "public  good"  on these  grounds,  but this does not accord  with  standard
definitions.  A public  good  is non-excludable,  meaning  you  cannot  charge  for it even in principle,  since
non-payers  cannot  be excluded  from benefitting.  A public  good  is also  non-rivalrous  meaning  that one
person's use of the good  does not reduce  the amount  available  for others. While  underutilized  classrooms
may fall into this category,  usually  teacher's  time  and classroom  seats  are limited.
8private sector.  If the government  was providing  education  but the private sector  could still
provide  more (with  perfectly  elastic supply),  then  the public  education  would  completely
crowd  out private education,  making  the net benefit  of this public  program  zero
(Devarajan  et al. [19971,  Hammer  [1997]),
While quantitative  analyses  of the benefits  of public-expenditure  programs  (in the
welfare-theoretic  sense developed  here) are hard to come by, there is some  evidence  that
is suggestive. Hammer  et a.  [1995]  evaluate  the impact  on infant mortality  of the
Malaysian  government's  expenditures  on public  medical  personnel  and immunization.
They find that government  spending  on doctors  at the margin  has no significant  effect  on
infant mortality  whereas  spending  on services  such  as immunization  which  have clear
external  effects  is highly significant. Spending  on public  medical  personnel  was simply
crowding  out private medical  personnel,  leaving  the net effect  not significantly  different
from zero. Similar  results  for health  care  have been  found by Alderman  and Lavy [1996];
for income  transfers  by Cox and Jimenez  [1995],  and for secondary  education  by
Jimenez,  Lockheed  and associates  [1996].
Finally,  the theory of the second-best  is often  invoked  in justifying  and evaluating
public  expenditures.  If there is a distortion  in the economy,  then government
intervention,  and possibly  government  expenditure,  in some  other  (undistorted)  market
may be warranted  because  it can affect  welfare  in the distorted  market. For example,  if
there is a failure  in the credit market  that prevents  young  people  from obtaining  student
loans,  then  public support  to education  may be justified. Note however  that  two
conditions  have  to be met. First, the market  in which intervention  is being considered
must be linked  to a truly distorted  market. Second,  removing  the original  distortion  must
9be more difficult  or costly  than  this "secon4-best"  approach. As to the first, the mere
fact that government  policies  change  conditions  in related  markets  is not per se a
justification. Such  effects  could  be of the form  of a "pecuniary  externality"  where  the
impact  of a policy  is solely  through  the workings  of competitive  markets.  There  may be
distributional  consequences  as, say,  universal  primary  education  supported  by
government  could well  raise  the wages  of teachers  (or all people  who are potential
teachers)  but if the supply  of such  factors  is competitive,  the existence  of such effects
poses no difficulties  or particular  issues for policy  analysis. If, however,  there are serious
market failures  associated  with these  affected  activities,  then there  is a need for taking
these  into account.  For example,  a project  such  as a road which  indirectly  increases  steel
output  would  not have  to take  into account  the changes  in steel  or of the coal  or labor
used in its production  if these  were all competitive  markets.  If, however,  steel production
caused  pollution,  the value  of the reduction  of pollution  would  be a further  cost of the
project  which  would  have  to be valued. This example  also illustrates  the second
condition. Appropriate  pollution  control  policies  directdy  applied  to the steel  industry
would  obviate  the need for the road project  to worry  about steel  production. Only  when
such  policies  are unavailable  (for  technical  or political  reasons)  is this interconnectedness
important  (Sen [1972]).
As the discussion  on evaluating  public  expenditures  makes  clear,  the fact that
governments  affect  the risk profile  (and hence  welfare)  of private  agents  is not sufficient
justification  for there  to be a public  expenditure  program  to mitigate  risk. But many
markets  associated  with the bearing  of risk are characterized  by market  failures. In some
cases,  the markets  may  simply  not exist. In others,  private  agents  will supply  a sub-
10optimal  level of risk-reduction.  Consequently,  there is a role for government,  both in
attempting  to correct  these market  failures  directly,  and-where that may  not be
feasible-in  addressing  risk-market  failures  through  intervention  in other markets.
IL Applying  the Framework
Several  important  failures  in risk  and risk-related  markets  can be discussed  with
reference  to the framework  outlined  in section  I. The most common  one in the literature
is the frequent  absence  of insurance  markets. The simple  model  of individual  decision-
making  under risk specified  above  implies  that there  will be a demand  for insurance-a
willingness  to pay the quantity  V above and  beyond  the actual  expected  cost of assuring
wealth  W. A firm  that can pool all risks and ensure  a payment  to all customers  to make
their income  W-V can collect  V as profit. Competition  should  drive this profit down  to
the actual  cost of providing  the insurance  itself,  so that  people  will end up paying  this
cost which is less  than V, gaining  consumer  surplus  from  the difference.
However,  there are numerous  reasons  why such  a market  will fail to emerge  or
will supply  insurance  in far less  than optimal  amounts. They  fall under  the general
categories  of adverse  selection  and moral hazard  (Rothschild  and Stiglitz  [1974]).
Adverse  selection  occurs  when  there is asymmetric  information  between  buyers  and
sellers of insurance. For example,  an individual  may  know if he is a bad health risk, but
an insurance  company  may not be able to detect  this. Consequently,  insurance  companies
offer health  insurance  reflecting  the average  risk of the population. But at this price, only
those with a higher-than-average  risk will purchase  insurance. As a result, the lower-
than-average  risk population  leaves  the market,  saddling  the insurance  company  with a
11riskier population  than they  expected. If the company  raises  its premium,  even  more
people  leave  the market,  and eventually  the market  dries up.
Moral  hazard  is a situation  where  an individual,  having  purchased  insurance,  may
have an incentive  to undertake  suboptimal  levels  of risk-reducing  activity. For instance,
purchasers  of theft insurance  may not lock  their doors,  even  though  society  will be better
off if they did. Perhaps  the most graphic  example  is that  of arson-when  people  bum
down their own  houses  to collect  on fire insurance.
The existence  of moral hazard  and adverse  selection  can prevent  the insurance
market  from appearing  at all. The complete  absence  of the market  imposes  costs on
people  of the full amount  of V. But  this fact  alone does  not  justify government
intervention-let alone  government  expenditure-in risk markets. The first question  to
ask is whether,  by intervening,  the govenment can do better.
That someone,  such as an insurance  company,  has the ability  to pool or otherwise
bear  the risks that, at least, some  individuals  would  prefer  not to is a basic  insight  into the
value that government  can bring  to the market. Efficient  markets  will result in those who
either  do not care as much (are less  risk averse)  or who have  such risk-reducing  options
as diversification  opportunities  available  to them actually  having  more risk shifted  onto
them from the more risk-averse,  less  protected  consumers,  picking  up some,  fraction  of V
along  the way. Government  may be in the position  to bear  this risk itself  better  than some
individuals.  Then  the government  does  the pooling. However,  it is not clear how
publicly-provided  insurance  gets around  the problems  of adverse  selection  and moral
hazard. Alternatively,  the government  may choose  to regulate  insurance  markets,  to
12correct  some  of the existing  failures. In either  case,  the main thrust  of the policy  will be
to shift risks and  the value of doing  so is V per affected  person.
Explicit  insurance  is not the only way that people  deal  with exposure  to risk. In
many circumstances,  people  have  opportunities  to reduce  their own  exposure  through
diversification  of various sorts. The classic  example  forms  the basis of the contemporary
theory of finance. The value of any security  is not simply  its expected  return but is
related  to the degree  to which it is correlated  with the rest of the market and therefore
serves  to reduce  the risk of holding  portfolios.  In our notation, there is a premium  to be
paid to any one asset e, if it can reduce  the variation  of the sum of all retuns-the
investor's net variance.
People  have other  means to help  deal with risk. In traditional  societies,  the
extended  family  provides  an insurance  policy of sorts. Hard  times may result in intra-
family  transfers  with either  explicit  or implicit  repayment  arrangements,  i.e., they may  be
gifts or loans. The credit  market  itself may  serve  as an insurance  mechanism  if people use
it to borrow  or draw  down savings  in bad years  and pay back  or build up savings  in good.
However,  as will be seen shortly,  credit  markets  themselves  are often faulty for reasons
similar  to insurance  markets,  especially  for consumption  loans.  The degree  to which they
are faulty will determine  the value of policies  which  reduce  the risk that one would
borrow  against.
In sum,  the valuation  of mitigating  risk needs  to be in comparison  to the net
exposure  Yei  after diversification  or other  protective  activities  are undertaken. Savings
on any real costs associated  with the protection,  however,  would  be another  benefit  from
13the program.  For example,  agricultural  households  are sometimes  noted  to have more
livestock  or other,  relatively  liquid,  productive  assets  than  would  be justified  by
considerations  of profitability  alone. The increase  in farm  profits  from shedding  such
unprofitable  activities,  due to having  to handle  less  risk or having  more  efficient  means of
handling  those  risks,  would  be a benefit  of an insurance  program  for say,  crops or health
or even  unemployment.
The actual  calculation  of certainty  equivalent  incomes,  or, the risk premium  that
could  be obtained  from people,  requires  specifying  an explicit  functional  form for utility.
This introduces  a highly subjective  element  into the calculation  as this is not a directly
observable  function. Further,  there is no reason  to believe  it is common  across  people,
nor even  that the degree  of risk aversion  on the margin  are equal, unless  markets  are
working  so well  as to allow  the equalization  of marginal  risk across  people. But if such
markets  did exist,  there  would  be no particular  justification  of government  intervention  at
all.  The most careful  calculation  would  try to approximate  the willingness-to-pay  for a
particular  degree  of risk-reduction  for different  types  of people  and add  up across  types
(differing  by income,  risk aversion  and degree  of wealth  at risk).
Finally,  in addition  to providing  insurance,  governments  use a variety  of other
instruments  to address  problems  of risk. For instance,  governments  may attempt  mitigate
the risk of price  fluctuations  facing  farmers  by agreeing  to buy farm  output  at a fixed
price, even when  the world  price is varying. In what follows,  therefore,  we examine  two
forms of public  expenditures  associated  with risk-reduction:  public  provision  of
insurance,  and  other  public  expenditures  that alter the risk profile  facing  individuals.
14A.  Government  provision  of insurance
Government  policies  can affect  various different  components  that go into the
calculation  of the risk  premium. Sometimes  govermments  attempt  to provide  insurance
directly  when the market  does  not. Two  common  areas  where  this occurs  is in health and
crop insurance.
Health  insurance. While  direct  provision  of services  is more common  in the
developing  world,  many  countries  have  instituted  explicit  health insurance  as a means  to
help  people deal  with the financial  consequences  of medical  care.  The issue of health
insurance  is a complicated  one to be sure-witness the recent debates  in the United States
and most other  OECD  countries. Here we only want to highlight  the issue of valuation  of
the benefits  of health insurance. From the perspective  of correcting  market failures,  the
benefit  that the public can obtain  over and above  the laissez-faire  equilibrium  can be
substantial. As mentioned,  insurance  markets  for medical  services  are likely  to be
seriously  distorted. In the early  part of this century,  the insurance  industry  in the U.S.
considered  medical  care  an uninsurable  service  because  of the severe  problems  of adverse
selection  in voluntary  markets  and in the potential  for abuse  in terms of moral hazard
(Arrow,  1966).  In the developing  world,  this situation  still  holds with very little private
insurance  existing  even where  medical  care itself  is largely  private (Lewis  and Chollet,
1997).
To a large  extent,  evaluations  of health  insurance  have focused  on the benefits  of
medical  services  rather than  the benefits  of the service  that the programs  actually  provide:
insurance  per se. By ignoring  risk-reducing  aspects,  many  discussions  of health
15insurance and the relative merits of services to be covered by public schemes have been
seriously flawed. The benefits of publicly provided health insurance should be the
willingness to pay for insurance services that are not available due to the market failure
reasons stated above. As a result, the value of public coverage depends at least as much
on the probability of illness and the size of the expenses avoided by the policy as on the
medical benefits of the treatments covered.  For example 4,  if there is no insurance, what
happens when a person falls ill with a condition that is treatable? The person could either
choose to take the treatment or decide that it is too expensive and suffer with the
condition. If he chooses to take the treatmnent,  then the value of public coverage of that
condition is no longer related to the medical value of the treatment since the person is
treated with or without public support. The value that public policy brings to this case is
purely financial and is the willingness to pay, ex ante, for insurance against that disease
condition.  If the standard (constant relative risk aversion) utility function is used to
analyze this situation, the value of insurance will be: V= Y-U-'(pU(Y-C)+ (1-p)U(Y))
where Y is income, p is the probability of illness and C is the cost of the treatment. Note
that health effects of the treatment do not appear in the valuation. This value must be
higher than the administrative cost associated with processing the insurance.  Otherwise
there is no gain to be had from insuring the service at all and it would be better to have
people pay out of pocket when they need it.
' This example  is taken  from Hammer  and Pritchett  (1997).
16If the person  would  not purchase  the treatment  out of pocket  because  it was too
expensive,  we might still ask if the person  would  have purchased  actuarially  fair
insurance  for the treatment  had it been available.  The answer  to this question  is no longer
independent  of the health benefits  that the treatment  provides.  A person  would be
indifferent  between  buying insurance  and not if the following  equality  holds: pU(H 1, Y-
pC) + (l-p)U(HO,  Y-pC) = pU(H 2, Y) + (l-p)U(HO,Y)  where  Ho  is health status  when not
sick at all, H 1 is health status  after  treatment  when sick and H 2 is health  status when sick
and left untreated.  The left hand side is expected  utility if you are insured  and getting
treatment  that improves  your health  status  from H 2 to H 1 and the right hand side is the
expected  utility of refusing  to insure  and taking  the risk  of suffering  with health status  H 2
if you get ill. All of this is contingent  on U(H,, Y-C)<U(H 2, Y) since  we have assumed
this treatment  would  not have been  purchased  out of pocket. The value of providing
insurance  in this case is the difference  between  the left and right hand sides of the above
inequality.
To illustrate:  Figure 2 shows  the above  relations  graphed  in the space of cost of
treatment  and health benefits  of treatment.  For the case of treatments  which  would  be
purchased  out of pocket,  curve OA is drawn  with a health status  of H, when ill since  it is
assumed  that treatment  will be taken.  The figure  is divided  (by solid lines) into four areas.
In area I, treatment  would  be paid  for out of pocket  but people  would  prefer  to insure
against  it. In area  II, people  would  pay for treatment  out of pocket  but would  not bother  to
buy insurance  since such  treatments  are too cheap  to cover  the administrative  costs of
17insurance  (aspirin  for headaches  is a good example) 5. In area III, people  would  neither
buy  the treatment  out of pocket  nor demand  actuarially  fair insurance  for it. In area  IV
people  would  not buy  the treatment  out of pocket  but would  pay for insurance  for it. This
represents  a catastrophic  loss for direct  purchase  but is rare enough  to have  a sufficiently
low expected  cost to be worth  the insurance  value.
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Figure  2: The Demand  for Insurance
For comparison,  the ray OC has been  superimposed  on the graph.  These  points share  a
common  "cost-effectiveness  ratio",  or a constant  health  benefit  per dollar spent  on a
The actuarially  fair costs  of insurance  should,  strictly  speaking,  have  included  the administrative  costs,  A,
and be equal  to Y-PC-A.
18medical treatment. This has been proposed as a criterion for public intervention in health
care (Jamison, et al, 1994) and as a criterion for inclusion in an insurance package, public
or private (Gold et al, 1996). As illustrated here, treatments sharing a common cost-
effectiveness ratio fall into all four areas.  Thus, cost-effectiveness ratios provide no
information whatsoever concerning the value of provision when insurance markets are
absent-the  market failure that justifies public coverage of the private benefits of health
care 6. Further, within areas I and IV, where insurance would be demanded if available,
the loss imposed by the absence of insurance rises with the cost of treatment. The cost
effectiveness ratio, on the other hand, worsens with higher costs and thus moves in the
opposite direction from the true valuation of public provision.
Crop insurance.  Crop insurance is another area in which governments have
sometimes provided a direct insurance instrument which private insurers would not.  The
reasons why such insurance policies would not be written by the private sector are again
the potentially large problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Moral hazard is a
particular problem because there are many actions that a farmer could take, that are not
easily (i.e., without very high cost) observable to the insurer, which determine crop
output along with truly random events such as rainfall and other farm-specific risks.
Effort and purchased inputs are two examples.  A cotton insurance program in India ran
into difficulty in part because some farmers would stop applying inputs (late in the
production cycle) when it appeared that output would not be much higher than insured-
6 The extemal benefits would be evaluated separately.
19for levels.' Detailed  characteristics  which  determine  land  quality  would  lead to adverse
selection  by those  who know  their land  to be poor.  There may  also be an interaction  of
the two  problems  if those  who  know  themselves  to be the type  who would  exploit  the
moral hazard  problem  would  also disproportionately  sign up for the program.
For all the reasons  that  private  markets  would  not support  crop insurance  markets,
the public  sector  has had a similarly  bleak  history  of providing  the service. Hazell,
Pomereda  and Valdes  [1986]  cite numerous  problems  which  have  plagued  public  crop
insurance  programs. Often,  a goal  of such  programs  is to be financially  sustainable.  The
reasoning  is that the service  provided  is genuinely  valuable  and can be covered  with
cesses  on agricultural  output. The fact  that these  programs  typically  cannot  be sustained
without  continual  subsidies  illustrates  a problem  which  should  be balanced  with the
identification  of a market  failure  in the private  sector.  In many cases  of seeming  failure  in
risk and information-related  markets,  there may  be no advantage  that govermnents  can
bring  to the problem  to improve  matters.  While  the maximum  potential  of providing
insurance  can be calculated  from the reduction  of risks that people  might like to avoid, it
is not always  the case  that governments  can improve  upon the allocation  of the market. If
there is nothing  that the government  could  know  that a private  insurer  could  not, then the
free market  allocation  may be "constrained  Pareto-optimal'.
That a market  is constrained  Pareto  optimal  means  that the government  cannot  do
any better than  the private  sector  by intervention  in the market  with the information
failure.  However,  as a result  of the theory  of the second  best, it is still  possible  that there
7 Reported  by Newbery  (1989).
20are other  instruments  directed  at complementary  or substitute  markets  which  can improve
welfare,  a topic to which  we now turn (Greenwald  and Stiglitz  [1982]).
B. Other  public  expenditures
Price Stabilization. Other  than  providing  insurance  directly,  governments
intervene  in less direct  ways.  Some  policies  are intended  to reduce  risk by changing
particular  elements  of a risky component  of income. One common  form of this is
through  commodity  price stabilization  schemes  (Newbery  and Stiglitz  [1981]). Countries
often  try to protect  producers  or consumers  from wide fluctuations  in the prices  of basic
commodities.  While  often  simply  a transfer  program  in disguise,  these stabilization
schemes  are publicly  advocated  as a way of reducing  risk. The value of the stabilization
plan to a producer  depends  on how  the price  variations  translate  into income. In turn, this
will depend  on the degree  of diversification  of farm  production  (monocultural  areas  being
at greatest  exposure  to price risk) or of farm  family  income  (farm  families  often  have
members  in non-agricultural  activities,  sometimes  as migrants  to cities,  as a hedge against
low farm  incomes),  access  to credit  and the nature  of the market  for farm  output.  As to
the last consideration,  if the commodity  whose  price is being stabilized  is not traded
internationally,  as may be the case  for basic staples,  then  prices would  ordinarily  rise in
times of low production  and fall in times of good production.  For a wide range of
demand  elasticities,  this market  mechanism  provides  substantial  smoothing  of farm
revenues. Indeed,  it is possible  (Newbery  and Stiglitz  [1981])  that stabilization  of prices
can de-stabilize  incomes  by removing  the negative  correlation  of price and sales. To the
extent  that price stabilization  leads  to income  stabilization,  the value of the scheme  can be
21approximated  by the formula:  V=-a x Aos2/2  where  a is the coefficient  of relative  risk
aversion  and Ac&2  is the change  in the variance  of income.
Transfer  Programs. Another  type  of government  policy  which  has significant
implications  for risk  reductions  are transfer  programs  for income  support.  Usually  these
are introduced  for reasons  completely  different  from  risk reduction  per se with the
exception  of unemployment  insurance.  Unemployment  insurance  is one area where  it is
clear that private  markets  are likely  to be limited  because  of the extreme  problem  of
moral hazard  and adverse  selection  inherent  in a voluntary  program. There  are many
reasons  for an individual  to know  his or her own  probability  of getting  fired  better  than an
insurance  company  would.  Indeed,  when combined  with  the moral hazard  problem-
people may choose  to be unemployed  if insured  at high rates-people  are certain  to
know more about  their own  inclinations  to abuse  the policy  in this way  than would  the
company.  So, except  for unusual,  job specific  assets  which  might  be covered  by a
specialty  insurance  contract  (such  as Lloyds  of London's  insuring  a pianist  against  broken
fingers),  unemployment  is not a good candidate  for private  insurance. Its benefit,  though,
may be estimated  by combining-the  concerns  for risk via the method  above  with models
of incentive  effects  of labor  supply.
Again  it is important  to evaluate  the benefits  of programs  relative  to private
adjustments  to the problem.  While  private  markets  for unemployment  insurance  are likely
to have serious  problems,  many  arrangements  in labor  markets  are clearly  motivated  by
concerns  over  risk-sharing.  lifetime  employment  guarantees  (explicit  or implicit)  as well
22as different  quantity  and wage  adjustments  as appear  in macroeconomic  models  are
examples. It is not likely  that the calculation  of benefits  would  be particularly  persuasive
in advocating  (or contesting)  the introduction  of unemployment  insurance  since  this is a
partic,larly politically  charged  area. However,  in the design  of different  elements  of the
program,  length  of time covered,  job search  requirements,  etc. may have quite  different
risk-reduction  characteristics  and may be evaluated  one against  the other differently.
Other  transfer  programs  have  risk-reducing  characteristics  even  if that is not their
main  justification. In the framework  above, safety  net provisions,  progressive  income
taxes  and other  redistributive  policies  can induce  a negative  correlation  of government
transfers  with random  shocks  to income. We might think of the policy  as one which
makes  the net-of-tax-and-transfer  income  a function  of the random  shocks  which  make up
income  as in W(EeJ) where  W'<0. The transfer  program  will have its main benefit in the
promotion  of equity  and its main costs associated  with incentive  effects  for work.
However,  there could  be a further  benefit  on efficiency  grounds  due to the risk-reducing
nature  of the policy. As an example:  a linear  income  tax system  (with  a lump-sum
transfer  component)  would  make after  tax income  a linear  function  of pre-tax  income
with slope  b= (1-t) < 1,  where  t is the tax rate. The variance  of income  for any one
individual  is reduced  to b 2 times the original  variance.  From the above formula,  the value
of this reduction  in variance  is ax(1-b 2 )&2  /2. Depending  on the distributions  of risk
aversion and  the risky element  of income  across  people,  cs, this can be a substantial  sum.
For a tax rate of 30%, a typical  level of a of 2 and the risky component  of income  having
a variance  of 10%  of income,  this comes  to about 5% of income  as a welfare  gain.
23Public  Investment. Governments  often  justify public  investment--even  in private
goods, such as steel  plants  or textile  factories--on  the grounds  that the returns  on these
investments  are risky  and governments  are better  able to take such  risks. We now
evaluate  this argument  in light of the framework  developed  above.
The notion  that governments  are better  able  to take risks stems  from  the
proposition  due to Arrow  and Lind [1968]. They  argued  that, since  the government  is
able  to spread  the risk of a public  project  across  a large  number  of individuals  (namely,
taxpayers),  the amount  each individual  bears  is minuscule. The government  theh should
behave  as if it were risk-neutral,  even  if the individuals  in society  were risk-averse. The
corollary  is that the government  should  undertake  risky  projects  (with  a positive
expected  value)  that private  firms,  being  risk-averse,  would  not.
For several  reasons,  the Arrow-Lind  theorem  may  not apply  to developing
countries. First, the risks associated  with some  public  projects  may  not be easily spread
across  the population. Large  irrigation  projects,  such as the Aswan  Dam in Egypt or the
Mahaweli  Scheme  in Sri Lanka,  could  have an impact  on the fortunes  of the whole
country. In fact, to the extent  that public  projects  are producing  public  goods, a case  can
be made that by definition  the returns  on the project  are not independent  of other  risks
faced by individuals. If the project's output  is non-excludable  and non-rival,  then  the
risks associated  with the project  are also non-excludable  and non-rival. When  a dam
bursts, the costs  cannot  be easily  proportioned  across  the affected  population  (Fisher,
1973).
24Second,  while governments  in richer  countries  with wide tax bases are in a
position  to diversify  their risk, smaller  countries  with narrower  tax bases may not be.
Meanwhile,  the private sector  may  be represented  by a multinational  corporation  with
access  to many  more risk-diversifying  instruments. This is especially  true if the
investment  is in a private good,  where  te  justification  for government  involvement  is
weak  to begin  with.
Third,  the nrsk  associated  with a project  may not be some  exogenous  factor, such
as an earthquake  or flood,  but political  risk. Especially  for large infrastructure  projects
with high up-front  investment  costs, the major risk facing  a private investor  is that the
government  may nationalize  the enterprise,  or impose  foreign-exchange  restrictions  on
multinationals'  expatriating  their profits. In this case,  the most appropriate  response  of
government  would  be to provide  a guarantee  against  these events  (since it is the
government  that controls  them). Of course,  a government's  unilateral  provision  of a
guarantee  may  not be credible,  so a neutral  third party,  such as the World  Bank, could
provide  the guarantee  and monitor  it. The increasingly  widespread  use of these guarantee
instruments  in developing  countries  is testimony  to the importance  of political  risk in
infrastructure  investment  decisions. This is an example  of governments'  addressing  the
appropriate  market  failure,  namely,  that  of political  risk insurance. Technological
progress  has turned many  kinds of infirtructure into private goods,  so there is no longer
a compelling  case for public  provision  of urban  roads,  power  and telecommunication.
Yet, there remains  the problem  of political  risk which  hinders  private  investment  in this
sector. The solution  is not for governments  to undertake  the infiastructure  investment,
25but to address  the risk market  failure,  by entering  into contracts  with guarantees  against
political  risk.
Public Consumption.  As mentioned  above,  in poor  countries,  public  health
insurance  schemes  are less  common than  direct  public  provision  of health  care. The
reasons  for this pattem  are complex. They  are likely  to include  the relative  monitoring
and regulation  requirements  of an arm's length  insurance  program  versus management  of
services. In any  case, whether  insurance  is publicly  provided  or not, the fear of
catastrophic  loss is a fact  of life everywhere,  and the ability  to pay out of pocket  for
expensive  medical  treatment  may  be quite limited  even  when actuarially  fair insurance
would  be affordable.
Much of the health  care budgets  of developing  countries  is devoted  to hospital
care. This has generally  been criticized  by donor  countries  as being "inefficient"  and
inequitable  in comparison  to providing  lower  level  primary  health  care. However,  given
that people  may be willing  (and  therefore,  able)  to pay for relatively  cheap  services  but
cannot  pay for the catastrophic  financial  burden  of hospital  services,  there is likely  to be
an efficiency  argument  for subsidy  to expensive  medical  care.  Here,  the benefit  of public
expenditure  in health  should  take into account  the improvement  in welfare  from risk
reduction  as well as any direct  benefit  of the services.  This will be important  for the
higher  end services.
This observation  does set  up a potential  conflict  between  efficiency  and equity
objectives. It is true,  as the donor community  points  out, that hospital  services  tend  to be
disproportionately  used by higher income  people  and that the political  power  of urban
26elites  has distorted  investment  priorities  towards  hospital services  as a result. While
some  reconciliation  of the two goals  is possible  (such as fees for outpatient  service  for
everyone  and strict controls  on referrals  for inpatient  services,  limiting  free access to
thosq  with medical  need  rather than  social influence),  there  will still  be a residual  conflict
between  the subsidy  for high-end  services  and using health  expenditures  for redistribution
goals.
As an application  of this approach  we consider  a recent  project  in Indonesia.
Anmong  other things,  the project  provides  emergency  referral  and transportation  for
pregnant  women  with complications  during  delivery. The cost of such services  is quite
high,  but the probability  of surviving  the delivery  is greatly  enhanced.
Since several  of the variables  in the calculation  are either  subjective  or difficult  to
determine,  a sensitivity  analysis  was performed  on the calculation  of risk premia  with
regard  to probability  of need,  risk aversion  and cost of the service. A complete
evaluation  would depend  on the joint distribution  of these parameters,  and would  require
the summation  of each family's willingness  to pay to get at the overall  insurance  value.
Nevertheless,  the calculation  for a single  household  with typical  parameter  values is quite
revealing. It shows  that for services  that could  potentially  cost a substantial  fraction  of
the family's wealth,  the value of risk  reduction  per se can be in the neighborhood  of 40
percent  of the expected  cost of the service. Evaluations  that neglect  this effect can,
therefore,  be far off.
27Willingness  to Pay  for Risk  Reduction:  Women's  Health
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Government guarantees..  As mentioned above, credit markets are often operating
sub-optimally due to information problems, leaving open the possibility of government
improvement. One kind of investment which is particularly prone to such problems is in
human capital, or education to the layman.  Two features of the market for loans to
finance education make it particularly subject to distortion from uncertainty. First, as in
consumption loans to smooth fluctuations in earnings, loans for education are generally
unsecured. In the absence of slavery, lenders usually have no feasible way to impose
collateral requirements-people  are particularly mobile. This makes the market for loans
for education (especially higher education since it is more expensive both in fees and in
financing consumption over the period) especially risky from the lenders' perspective,
thus reducing loans for that purpose.  On the borrower's side, there is another
consideration. For the same reason that you cannot put yourself up as collateral, you also
cannot sell shares in yourself. As a result, the decision to enter a particular, specialized
28field represents  a decision  to "plunge"  into a market. It is not possible  to diversify  your
human  capital  investments  as it is to diversify  financial  investments.  This can have  two
possible  consequences.  First, it may simply  result in people  bearing considerably  more
risk than they  would  prefer, leading  to a direct  loss in welfare. Second,  to the extent that
this effect is stronger  in some  fields,  those  with strong  specialization  and subject  to large
swings in net demand  (engineering,  perhaps,  since  it is often  mentioned  as a "cobweb"
market)  this may  lead to people  shying  away  from  these subjects  toward  more generalist
professions  (lawyers,  perhaps).  In developed  countries  especially, a large part of the
assets that people  hold are in the form of education,  skills  and experience 8.
Policy implications  for these  market  failures  are not always  easy to define. The
absence  of a functioning  credit  market  holds open the possibility  of student  loan
programs  as a means of substituting  for the market. It does  not argue  particularly  well for
a tuition subsidy  as is common  for developing  countries  though it may provide  a third or
fourth  best solution.  Even a loan  program,  however,  does  not solve  the diversification
problem.  For this, there may  be some  benefit  in a risk sharing  arrangement  with
government-perhaps a surcharge  on income  taxes  for those  who attend  university  in
lieu of standard  repayment  schedules.
8Interestingly,  another  large  part  is in  the form  of real  estate,  a house  being one's largest  asset. This,  too,
is difficult  if not impossible  to diversify  and is subject  to very variable  returns  which  depend  on regional
markets.  To the extent  that returns  to skills  are also  associated  with  a dominant  regional  market,  these  two,
large  parts of a portfolio  are covariate;  witness  the fate of steel  or automobile  workers  in the "rust bell' of
the United  States  who lost both  jobs and equity  in their homes  as industry  declined.  See also Shiller  (1993).
29IIL  Concluding  Remarks
In this paper, we have argued  that there is a case  for incorporating  risk-reduction
as part of government  expenditure,  provided  that  the expenditure  meets  the standard
welfare-economics  criteria  for govermnent  intervention  in the economy. Using a series  of
examples,  we showed  areas  where  government  spending  on risk-reduction  could  improve
welfare,  either  by alleviating  a risk market  failure,  or by reducing  uncertainty  in otherwise
distorted  markets. We also gave  a few illustrative  calculations  of the risk-reduction
benefits  of public  expenditures  and pointed  to cases  where  their  neglect  could  lead  to
serious  underestimation.
Lest  our points  be interpreted  as a blanket  call for increased  government  spending
in these areas,  we mention  two important  caveats. First, the design  of optimal  policies  to
correct  infonnation-based  distortions  has to be approached  with care-and  it may stretch
the institutional  capabilities  of the government.  For instance,  the sophisticated  bidding
scheme  at the U.S. Federal  Communications  Commission,  , designed  by some  eminent
game  theorists  to maximize  revenue,  seems  to be prone  tQ  collusion  among  bidders. It is
currently  under  revision  given  the low prices  it has yielded  so far. Similarly,  our off-the-
cuff proposal  to tax university  graduates  still  has the effect  of subsidizing  the
consumption  value of education-for which  there is no particular  public  interest.
30The second  problem  raises  a deep,  fundamental  issue of incentives. While there is
demand  forureducing  exposed  risk as long as we think utility functions  exhibit
diminishing  marginal  utility, getting  rid of all risk leads to no reason  to do anything  at all
(this is the essence  of the moral hazard  problem  in the first  place). Hence,  when taken to
the limit, there is a fundamental  tradeoff  between  avoiding  risk and fostering  economic
growth.
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